Id. At 6566 (“The consideration of a promise is the thing given or done by the promisee in exchange for the promise”). 88. Karl N. Llewellyn, “On the Complexity of Consideration: A Foreword, ” 96 Colum. L. Rev.
Llewellyn continues, in an argument closely analogous to the one made here: In learning or teaching or “applying” “the doctrine” of “consideration, ” we have rather successfully obscured the disunity of field of fact-problem and also of doctrine by several devices. Poole has given rise to the notion that the consideration of a promise need not move from the promisee, though that 89. See 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 67. Holdsworth discusses the leading case of Dutton v. Poole, 98 Eng. Rep. 876, 889–85 ).
For a critique of the classical monistic view on remedies, see L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, “The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, ” pts. J. 89 The classical response to this issue was simply to call it a historical error, a misunderstanding of the true nature of consideration. Again, Langdell’s discussion is indicative. He admits that Dutton v. This book is a history of contract law in the United States around the turn of the twentieth century.
Breaking with conventional wisdom, the book argues that our current understanding of contract is not the outgrowth of gradual refinements of a centuries-old idea. Rather, contract as we now know it was shaped by a revolution in private law undertaken toward the end of the nineteenth. Stanford. Com). All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in SSO for personal use (for details see ). Date: 56 January 7568 This action might not be possible to undo.